Ironically, for almost the same reason that we had opposed the IPI we are once again being advised by our 'well-wishers' to oppose at all cost India's efforts to access to Afghanistan and Central Asia through road links connected via Pakistan. And here is their faulty reasoning: The then President of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, chose the Indian consortium as the preferred bidder for three of the four iron ore blocks in Hajigak mines that are estimated to hold more than 1.8 billion tons of iron ore. The deal would benefit one Indian business group of JSW, which is headed by Sajjan Jindal, a friend of our Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, in the amount of 90 billion dollars. As a result India would benefit in hundreds of billion dollars through this project, gain access to Central Asia, rule the economic might of the region, effectively become a regional power and Pakistan, the major challenger to Indian role, would be working under Indian dominion. Here the implication is, since Sajjan Jindal is a friend of our PM, may be even his business partner, the PM would oblige without bothering about its 'negative' fallout for Pakistan. I am not sure the PM would take the decision for private gain at the cost of public loss. But then even if that is the truth one does not see any public loss in the deal.
There is no doubt that India is desperately seeking a more economical and even shorter than the Iranian sea-port Chabahar route to reach the Central Asian market. And the only route that fits the Indian need and that also helps it access the Afghan market as well is the one that passes over-land through Pakistan from Wagha- Attari on India-Pakistan border to the Khyber Pass on Pakistan-Afghanistan border. So would not it be advisable on our part to calculate the price, both in terms of economy and politics that we could extract from India in return instead of only calculating the benefits accruing to India and fearing that Pakistan as a consequence, would become a satellite of New Delhi in case India succeeds in 'conning' Pakistan into allowing it the use of its land to reach lucrative markets? In terms of economy, the TAPI gas pipeline and CASA-1000 electricity linkage would immediately become a reality along with our access to the Central Asian market as a result. Besides, the income from the toll tax for use of our land both by India and Afghanistan and even China with CPEC opening into the route would perhaps partly compensate the shortfalls in our revenue income thereby reducing by as much our dependence on loans. Moreover, once India's vested economic interests get entrenched within the physical boundaries of Pakistan via its transit trade route one would not be wrong in presuming that New Delhi itself would become the guarantor of lasting peace, stability and sovereign independence of a nuclear Pakistan.
And what would be the political price we could ask from India in return? The Indian Held Kashmir (IHK) itself! And why not? In fact over the years the IHK has become a chronic migraine-like headache for India. India is spending an enormous amount of money to maintain a large contingent of its Army in the Valley. And even if the so-called moral, material or Jihadi help from Pakistan is stopped (which has been virtually stopped since 2008-09), the Valley, it has become too obvious for the Indian establishment, would remain in a perpetually rebellious mode with frequent rallies challenging the Indian hold marked by vociferous shouts of 'Pakistan Zindabad' slogans and provocative waving of Pakistani flags.
Here is a lengthy but telling excerpt from the last but one paragraph of the last page of a book entitled, Kashmir-The Vajpayee Years, by a former RAW chief, AS Dulat that further elucidates the argument forwarded in the preceding paragraph: "The Kashmiri has suffered for the last twenty-five years and though he largely blames himself, he is not internally at peace with the status quo. The peace with honour he bargained for still eludes him; he made a dignified exit. Why can a Kashmiri not be an Indian? We need to look deep into this question which disturbs us when a shopkeeper in Srinagar enquires, 'Aap India se aaye hain?' The Indian state is big enough to breach this psychological barrier. What Kashmir needs is not magnanimity but hard- nosed commonsense which Vajpayee displayed. Had he been around for a few more years or had Dr Manmohan Singh not missed the window of opportunity in 2006 or 2007, a solution around the Musharraf formula would have disposed of the problem for the foreseeable future. Now we need to engage with Kashmir (not just Mufti Saheb) and with Pakistan as well. The reason that people in Delhi have reservations about talking to separatists and Pakistanis are the very reasons we need to talk to them. As Mufti says, there is no other way." By the way Chief Minister of IHK, Mufti sahib is no more. It can be plausibly argued that the approach of his daughter Mehbooba Mufti, who is most likely to replace him, to the Kashmir issue will not be different from that of her late father's.