Insofar as this question is concerned, its answer could be in the affirmative because not only has the situation created dangerously sharp fissures among the owners of media houses, it has also caused long deep cracks in the community of journalists. That the representative bodies of media such as Pakistan Broadcasters Association (PBA), All Pakistan Newspaper Society (APNS), Council of Pakistan Newspaper Editors (CPNE) and Pakistan Federal Union of Journalists (PFUJ) seem to have failed to articulate a befitting response to the present unprecedented challenge so far is a strong case in point. Not only do they appear confused and directionless, they also seem to be at each other's throats. Journalists' overt aversion, for example, to polite behaviour that follows accepted moral standards and shows respect for others is now commonplace on TV screens and in newspaper columns. In other words, their conduct demonstrates a total lack of common decency.
Moreover, mass media, particularly its highly influential segment electronic media, are now being increasingly seen as a vehicle that has been fomenting unrest and promoting anarchy in society. Hosts of so many talk shows on current affairs themselves admit that they often encounter criticism from their viewers for creating feelings of gloom and depression and making people sad and without enthusiasm or hope. No doubt, such criticism cannot be termed frivolous.
The present situation shows that the country's institutions, including its establishment, in particular and the Pakistani society in general had no inkling of the challenges that an unprecedentedly free media would throw up for them with the arrival of satellite television or private TV channels in Pakistan. Unlike his immediate predecessors Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto who restricted their so-called initiatives to revamp of state television PTV and the introduction of semi-state PTN which was later named STN in view of global advancements in broadcast media and the consequent cultural wars unleashed by satellite TV channels from across the border in particular, army ruler General Pervez Musharraf showed little hesitation towards accepting the challenge of satellite television channels. His intention, however, was clearly premised on his designs to create a so-called `soft image' of the country to win the much-needed Western support to perpetuate his despotic rule following the situation created by the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001, the US attack on Afghanistan a few weeks later, and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, although he had already asked his able information minister Javed Jabbar, who quit the government in 2001, to formulate a policy in that regard. Musharraf's other main goal was to woo media owners for his support although he later lost favour with them with the imposition of emergency rule in the country that led to, among other things, imposition of curbs on media, particularly a highly vibrant broadcast media.
That the perception that the current crisis owes its origins to the attack on noted TV anchor Hamid Mir is not well-founded is quite plausible mainly because of the fact that the game plan of the then military ruler to obtain for the country a `soft image' abroad had created for media houses unprecedentedly huge swathes of space to compete for influence even in the spheres of government's policymaking processes. His plan, however, dangerously coincided with radicalization of various Muslim societies; his efforts aimed at promoting pseudo-secular and liberal values mainly through broadcast media with a view to appeasing the West were not only being seen with suspicions and disdain by the majority of country's population but also by his own colleagues such as Chaudhry Shujaat Husain. The imposition of Emergency that inflicted a significant financial harm on TV channels turned his media friends into permanent foes. The hostility that they exhibited for Musharraf went beyond his rule or action; media houses, particularly the one that claims to be the biggest in terms of its share in the market, seems to have harbored a kind of eternal animosity against the institution that Musharraf had headed. The reporting of and talk shows on General Musharraf's treason trial caused considerable resentment and rage among army officers in particular who accuse media, particularly that media group, of overstepping their limits. The attack on TV anchor seemed to have thrown up an opportunity for that media channel to take the 'cold war' to new heights by making the ISI and its chief, a serving lieutenant-general, the target of its wild allegations. Little did, however, that TV channel know that it was going to commit a Himalayan blunder by overplaying its hand; its intrepidity or dauntlessness has unfortunately morphed into an invitation to some profound threats to its very survival.
The question why some curbs, including a review of licensing policy that seeks to re-examine cross-media or any other form of ownership, generated by a new `code of conduct' and some regulatory actions for media in general and that particular media house in particular look imminent under a democratic or civilian dispensation has its answer in the ban on six evening newspapers during the second term of Benazir Bhutto, although the charges of causing unwarranted sensationalism and despondency in society through "irresponsible" journalism under which curbs on media were imposed pale in comparison with the charges that the Ministry of Defense has lodged against that media group.
The evolving situation in the country suggests that the army seeks to redress its complaint through a whole corpus of laws and regulations, but it seems to be in no mood-at least at this point in time- to countenance the rigmarole of unending litigations and protracted hearings of its petition; it's keen to see a decision to its satisfaction anytime soon.
The situation, therefore, leads to yet another profound question: How will the media, a large part of which is gloating over the misery of the largest media group with a view to occupying the space it loses because of its "unpopularity" and regulatory action against it, react to the situation? A readily available answer could be: a larger part of rest of the media will acquiesce to any punitive action that the government takes against that media house particularly after the broadcast of highly objectionable episodes of two different entertainment programs by this TV channel. The history of press of Pakistan tells us that it were the newspapers that helped the then government bring to an end the publication of pre-partition-founded Civil and Military Gazette (C&MG) by carrying a joint editorial through which they asked the government to suspend it "for a suitable period" for committing "treason".
It is, however, unlikely that the US, the sole global superpower that plays a role in determining policymaking processes and imperatives in Pakistan, and the European Union, will accept any punitive action that leads to a ban on that beleaguered media house which has been seemingly deriving its strength from the support of present government because of latter's faith in the majesty and enormity of media power. It is heartening to note that the government is now desperate to broker a deal between army and that media house through which the latter tenders an unconditional apology, recognises the need for beefing up the editorial oversight with a view to forestalling the broadcast of programs that could hurt people's sentiments, receives a stern warning that is accompanied by a strong rebuke for acting in a highly unprofessional, unethical and anti-national manner and accepts the fact that the media are always required to wear the national badge in relation to country's defense and foreign affairs.-The writer is newspaper's News Editor and a former President of Karachi Union of Journalists (KUJ). He was the chairman of constitution-making committee of Confederation of Asian Journalists' Association (CAJU).
The views expressed in this article are strictly his own; these do not necessarily reflect those of the newspaper.