The new unified policy comprises two components: inclusion of at least some members of the Taliban into the Afghan government and handing over security responsibilities, over a specified period, to Afghan forces. The remarks by Clinton, however, indicated that at this stage, the western participants were not thinking about reconciliation with the main Taliban leadership, but only the induction of a number of disgruntled 'foot soldiers' and may be a smattering of middle or lower level leadership.
This fell short of Karzai's proposal of reaching out to the top echelons of the Taliban, leading to 'an invigorated international peace effort with the militant Islamic group, starting with an initial meeting in a few weeks.' Karzai told a gathering of officials from about 70 countries and international groups - assembled to discuss the efforts to wind down the war - that he is seeking the mediation of Saudi Arabia and the blessing of Pakistan to try to negotiate peace with the leadership of the militants.
The idea, however, did not get a warm reception from the United States for the obvious reason that making peace with an opponent that has killed well above 1,000 western troops is highly sensitive with Americans and their allies. Clinton was, however, willing to engage with the Taliban leaders that Karzai hoped to bring to a grand jirga.
There was a perception at the meeting that while the US was allergic to the idea of pursuing peace with the leadership, it might change its mind in days to come, in case the Taliban agreed to say goodbye to al Qaeda, renounce violence and follow the Afghan Constitution. Meanwhile, the official Taliban response to the one-day conference was negative.
A statement posted on a Taliban website on Wednesday dismissed the international conference as a "waste of time." The Taliban statement said that economic incentives would not lead the religious militia to give up their cause. This clearly indicated that they were not opposed to a deal, provided it was more beneficial to them.
What has happened during the last few weeks indicates important changes in the stances of the antagonists, presenting a possibility of a negotiated peace over time. The Karzai government has tried, and partially succeeded in getting the names of important second rank Taliban leaders removed from the UN blacklist, which would remove restrictions on their travel abroad. This could not have happened without US consent.
The Taliban, who had all along rejected peace overtures and wanted to achieve victory solely through force of arms, were now keen to hold talks, though not with the US or Karzai at this stage, but with the special UN representative for Afghanistan. The meeting was reportedly held at Taliban's own request to "hold talks about talks". In case things move ahead, the possibility of direct talks with the US cannot be ruled out.
That they should indicate willingness to talk when they were enjoying upper hand in the fight is all the more important. Another significant fact is the willingness on the part of the US to induct some of the Taliban at a time when over 100,000 foreign troops, largest ever since hostilities started nine years back, have gathered in Afghanistan, and more are in transit.
But if Generals Petraeus and McChrystal are to be believed, the purpose of the surge is not to prolong the war, but to help the US negotiate peace from a position of strength. Apparently, both sides have realised that fighting is no longer in their interest. Both sides need to be encouraged to sit together to bring peace to the war-ravaged country through talks.
There are a number of problems that stand in the way. Karzai wants to invite the Taliban to a grand jirga of elders, for which they display little enthusiasm. The nexus between Taliban and al Qaeda remains unbroken. Unless this is severed, Afghanistan will continue to serve as a staging post for terrorists threatening peace all over the world. Iran's absence from the London talks is a signal that it could keep the pot boiling in Northern Afghanistan if the US pressure is not released on Tehran.
Dangling jobs and money before the Taliban could deepen ethnic divisions with the minorities like the Tajiks and Hazaras, who may see the rewards as an unfair windfall for the Pashtun, who make up most of the Taliban's recruits. Will the Taliban agree to an accommodation with the Northern Alliance, which is necessary to keep the country united? Then there are mavericks like Gulbadin Hikmatyar, who are not a part of the Taliban and could act as spoilers if not roped in. Any Afghan government will need the help of the neighbouring countries, more than distant India, to ensure peace.
Islamabad is concerned that an early troop withdrawal would mean Afghanistan becoming a place for different countries to promote their own national agenda. While Obama has said that US troops would start withdrawing by the end of 2011, the withdrawal has to be gradual. Any vacuum, created by a sudden US departure, would be disastrous for the region as well as the US.