The reforms at the start of the decade, pushed through with the blessing of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, eliminated a state-run cocoa market stabilisation fund Caistab and also ended a guaranteed minimum price for farmers.
It replaced this with several sectorial supervisory bodies, including the Coffee and Cocoa Bourse (BCC) which now sets a purely indicative farmgate price.
Industry experts, exporters and growers' representatives said the much-vaunted liberalisation had failed to deliver the promised benefits of improved income for Ivory Coast's cocoa farmers or more efficiency and transparency in the sector.
"The reforms didn't achieve their objectives because they were done hastily and under pressure from international donors who thought that the old stabilisation fund was being used by the government as its private account and that this had to be smashed," said former Caistab director Marie-Louise Acquah.
Experts said the liberalisation had three main goals: to allow farmers to obtain for their cocoa at least 70 percent of the world market price, to end wasteful government spending of cocoa revenues and to allow producers to run their own sector.
But none of these had been achieved.
"I don't think the farmers get even 40 percent of the world price now," said Acquah, who advises the government on the commodities sector.
Ivory Coast produces 40 percent of the world's cocoa and the sector accounts for more than 40 percent of the West African country's export revenues and nearly 15 percent of its GDP.
But despite recent bumper harvests, Ivorian cocoa farmers faced fluctuating prices and poor working conditions.
QUALITY QUESTIONS "The reforms have not improved the living conditions of the planters. They're as poor as before and some even earn less than before, " said Solange N'Guessan, director of the San Pedro co-operatives buying centre UNICABS.
She said the price liberalisation had even had a damaging effect on crop quality levels, because as prices oscillated wildly, farmers were often forced to rush beans to market without having time to fully check their quality.
"The producers have to quickly sell their beans - even if they're not in good shape - to take advantage of higher prices when they come," N'Guessan added.
There had also been little or no investment of cocoa revenues in the upkeep or improvement of basic infrastructure such as roads linking the growing areas to the ports.
This situation had worsened since a 2002 civil war that split the country in two. The government controls the south and rebels control the north, while UN and French peacekeepers patrol a porous and sometimes tense buffer zone.
"Everything has deteriorated and plantations are not maintained because growers can't afford to," Acquah said.
PRICE CONFUSION Unlike the pre-liberalisation era, when the state regulator set a guaranteed minimum price, the BCC now announces a minimum farmgate price which is purely indicative and which buyers and exporters have no obligation to follow.
"So we've got three prices now. The policy price (of the BCC), the exporters' price and the buyers' price. All these prices confuse farmers ... they would all like to get back to the Caistab system, where even if the price was lower at least it was respected," N'Guessan said.
In October, the BCC set a minimum indicative farmgate price of 400 CFA francs ($0.736) per kg of "good fermented" cocoa for the first three months of the 2005/06 season.
Although this was slightly higher than the 390 CFA francs set for the whole of 2004/05, it was less than prices offered in neighbouring Ghana. This could encourage smuggling.
Exporters said the liberalisation had also failed to deliver the promised transparency in the cocoa sector.
"It's difficult to work because nothing is clear. We just take it day by day," oen European exporter said.