These demands reflect the anger and frustration felt by agriculturists in the lower riparian areas, who feel hard done by in terms of not getting even their share of admittedly lower than normal water.
There are some seasonal (short term) and some inherent reasons why the issue of water availability has reached such a pass.
This summer's variable weather has meant the normal rate of melting of snows on the mountains has not occurred, resulting in lower rates of flow in all the rivers.
Inherently, the Indus Water Treaty divided the rivers of the Indus basin, giving the upper riparian India the three eastern rivers, Sutlej, Beas and Ravi, and retaining the three western rivers, Chenab, Jehlum and Indus, for Pakistan.
Critics of the Treaty tend to describe it as disadvantageous for Pakistan, since three rivers were 'lost' to us. What they fail to grasp is that the Treaty ensured the water of three rivers for Pakistan, which the upper riparian India was threatening to cut off otherwise.
The loss of the three eastern rivers was intended to be compensated by the construction of large dams and reservoirs on the rivers remaining to Pakistan, supplemented by canal and other works.
Unfortunately, because of controversies over water availability to the lower riparian provinces of Pakistan, particularly Sindh, only the Warsak, Mangla and Tarbela Dams have been successfully completed. Kalabagh and other dams have been caught in controversy, and without an elusive consensus on these dams, delays are inevitable and perhaps interminable.
Contrary to the critics' castigation of the Indus Water Treaty as a 'sellout' of Pakistan's water interests, the fact is that it has helped preserve Pakistan's share of the waters of the three western rivers, despite conflict, tensions and differences on plans for up-river barrages and other works by India.
Recently in fact, an Indian delegation in Islamabad had been discussing the controversial Wullar Barrage.
This barrage has invited a difference of opinion between Pakistan and India relating to whether the proposed barrage and power house attached to it can store water in the Wullar Lake or can only be constructed as a run-of-the-river project.
The Indus Water Treaty inclines towards the latter interpretation, and offers perhaps the only viable bilateral solution to the impasse over Wullar.
If Pakistan and India have had their differences over water sharing as upper and lower riparian sovereign states, neither has escaped controversies and even conflicts between their domestic upper and lower riparian constituent units.
In Pakistan, for example, Punjab and Sindh have been at loggerheads for as long as one can remember on this very issue of water share, especially in times of scarcity and shortage.
If the reports on the deliberations of the parliamentary and technical committees set up to resolve these internal disputes in Pakistan are to be believed, there seems to be an emerging consensus that a return to the 1991 Water Accord offers the best hope of reconciliation of the conflicting claims by the federating units.
If the wisdom is dawning that domestic disputes over water can only be resolved by reliance on a consensus Accord, surely the argument for retention of the Indus Water Treaty as the best available means to preserve Pakistan's share of water has added force.
Instead of tilting against the Indus Water Treaty that has stood us in good stead over more than four decades, it would be wiser to concentrate on, and accelerate, the lining of water canals and courses to avoid water-logging and salinity, preserve water equivalent in the short term to the shortfall and in the long term to the capacity equivalent of three Kalabagh Dams, and learn to use this increasingly scarce resource optimally through water conservation and modern methods of irrigation.