Monday's terrorist attack in Lahore was just another of those grisly events to which the city has become so familiar since the beginning of the Millennium. How this latest suicide bomber carried out the attack is old stuff. His suicide jacket contained explosives, ball-bearings, and nuts and bolts, which flew like bullets to kill and maim people. Within an hour of the explosion, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan claimed responsibility and even released the photo of the suicidal young man who it said hailed from Swat. The police and other agencies concerned reached the site and collected evidence for forensic examination, and later during the night, some suspects who might have facilitated the attack were taken into custody. All in all, this attack and its aftermath were not very different from the scores of such incidents in Lahore and elsewhere in the country. A closer look into the event suggests there are quite a few aspects to it which could help comprehend as to why Pakistan's war against terrorism in urban localities hasn't been won so far. The Lahore attack, as well as the one coincidental to it in Karachi and some others recently in Quetta, hint at the terrorists' target: the police. Defeated by the armed forces on rough terrains and in mountainous regions the terrorists have come to the cities, where they confront the police force, which is now their prime target. The battlefield has shifted from the rural landscape to the urban. Defeating these evil forces is now all the more problematic, and we don't seem to be properly equipped for that kind of war.

A suicide bomber is like an arrow shot from the bow. He is simply unstoppable. So the best counter-terrorism effort should be that he is not enabled to carry out his job, and that is where intelligence agencies have their work cut out for them. We are in the war against terrorism for almost two decades. By now our intelligence agencies should have had in their possession far more comprehensive dossiers on the terrorist networks, the sleeper cells, and their facilitators. The suicide bomber does not bring the explosive-laden jacket from where he came from. Obviously, he is hosted by local facilitators, provided the jacket and familiarized with the targeted venue. At the same time, information extracted from suspects already held in custody for facilitation of possible penetration into these networks. It is doubtful that corporal punishments and beatings help deter wannabe suicide bombers. Truth is that post-attack activity by various agencies is not of much use either. What really matters is timely intelligence to forestall such incidents.

Another daunting challenge before the government and society is for these so-called defenders of Islam to be de-radicalized - be it by way of persuasion or use of force. Of course, the enemy too bankrolls terrorism in Pakistan, but not all these bombers. They hail from madressahs and schools, or from sectarian forums, bred as they are on hateful ideologies. It is time the government recast its counter-terrorism programme, mainly by strengthening the intelligence agencies and taking a harder line against hateful ideologies. The armed forces are doing what they can, but since the terrorists have shifted the battlefield to urban areas, all segments of government and society are expected to actively join this battle against militancy and terrorism.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2017